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Abstract. This paper discusses the possible intro-
duction of hidden reliability defects during CMOS
foundry fabrication processes that may lead to accel-
erated wearout of the devices. These hidden defects
or hardware Trojans can be created by deviation from
foundry design rules and processing parameters. The
Trojans are produced by exploiting time-based wear-
ing mechanisms (HCI, NBTI, TDDB and EM) and/or
condition-based triggers (ESD, Latchup and Softerror).
This class of latent damage is difficult to test due to its
gradual degradation nature. The paper describes life-time
expectancy results for various Trojan induced scenarios.
Semiconductor properties, processing and design param-
eters critical for device reliability and Trojan creation are
discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the high capital costs of building and maintain-
ing fabrication facilities, the number of fabs is shrinking.
Hence, there has been a major shift in control over
the fabrication process for integrated circuits (IC). More
and more vendors outsource the fabrication process to
off shore fabrication facilities [1]. Using such facilities
makes the integrated circuits vulnerable to malicious
alterations. These alterations are more commonly known
as hardware trojans and are usually created by insertion
of additional logic circuitry [1]. The intent of these
trojans ranges from functional changes of the circuit
to a complete system failure. Testing for Trojans at the
manufacturing level have been investigated using power
analysis techniques [2], [3], [4], delay testing [5], and
using test vectors [6].
In this paper we describe a new type of Trojan that
can be induced by intentional modification of fabrica-
tion process to accelerate wearing processes in CMOS
devices. These process modifications can keep the initial
performance parameters of the integrated circuit within
the accepted variation. Such Trojans can exploit the fol-
lowing wearing processes: Hot Carrier Injection (HCI),
Oxide Breakdown (OB), Negative Bias Temperature In-
stability (NBTI), Electron Migration (EM).
IC manufactures optimize their processes to ensure
the effects of the time based wear out mechanisms to
guarantee the lifetime of a device for 10 plus years over
a specific temperature range i.e. 0 to 70 ◦C for com-
mercial devices. IC manufactures bound their process
control limits to ensure production devices will not be
affected by the time based wear out mechanisms for the
guaranteed lifetime of the device. Figure 1 shows the
normal distribution of the manufacturing process with
the probability of a time based defect occurring within
the guaranteed device lifetime.
Production tests are not performed for these effects
as they are time based, and the testing costs would be
prohibitive. The production tests are optimized to find
defects using the lowest cost equipment in minimal test
time, and an acceptable test coverage to guarantee the
devices are functional. The time based effects can be
accelerated, but the test times are in days, which is not
practical for production.
A process engineer could maliciously modify certain
steps in the process that would cause some or all devices
on a wafer to wear out in months to few years, thus cre-
ating a reliability based Trojan. The paper will expound
on process modifications that could be maliciously used
to create reliability based Trojans. Figure 1 illustrates
how the process engineer could modify a step in the
manufacturing process to increase the probability that
devices will be produced with a time based wear out
mechanism. The parameters that affect these mechanisms
are exponential in nature, so only small changes are
needed in process steps. The overlap area in Figure 1
illustrates that a certain percentage of the devices on the
wafer will be infected with these reliability Trojans.
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Fig. 1. Shifting the Process Variation to induce a Hardware Trojan based on Stress
II. WEARING MECHANISM OF CMOS DEVICES
In this section, we discuss the following wearing
processes in CMOS devices. Hot Carrier Injection (HCI),
Oxide Breakdown (OB), Negative Bias Temperature In-
stability (NBTI), Electron Migration (EM) We explore
different degradation models and lifetime models for
each process to identify critical dependencies that can be
exploited via a Trojan device by process characterization
manipulation.
A. Hot Carrier Injection:
The term hot carrier injection describes electrons
(holes) that have accumulated sufficient kinetic energy to
overcome potential barrier and be injected into the gate
oxide. Such accumulation becomes more prominent in
high electric field for electrons that have avoided sub-
sequent scatterings with the lattice atoms. The carriers
must overcome the Si − SiO2 energy barrier of about
3.7eV for electrons and 4.6eV for holes. For NMOS,
hot electrons are produced and for PMOS holes are
produced.
Injection of hot carriers can result in the following:
generation of new traps at or near the Si − SiO2
interface or generation of new traps in the oxide itself.
The traps located at Si − SiO2 interface affect the
transconductance, gm, and leakage current of the device.
The traps that are located in the gate oxide increase the
threshold voltage, Vth. The carriers can also increase the
substrate current, Isub. Thus, the HCI degradation can
be monitored through shifts in the threshold voltage or
transconductance and drain current.
There are different models for predicting the lifetime
of the device based on the rate of HCI effect. One of
such models uses a relationship between the shifts in
gate current, Igate, and the HCI degradation, [7]. The
model assumes that the rate of HCI damage to the CMOS
device, ∆, is proportional to the gate current, Igate, and
can be expressed by the following equation:
∆/dt ∼ Igate = A(∆)
WIdrain
∗ ( Isub
Idrain
)m, (1)
where W is the width of the CMOS device, [8], [7].
Abbreviating the following, B = A(∆)/W and merging
that Median Time To Failure depends on the reciprocal
of d∆/dt, the failure rate is found from
λ = BIdrain(
Isub
Idrain
)m (2)
The following equation assumes static voltages and
currents, in order to determine dynamic degradation,
λ must be integrated over a full cycle time, [7] Such
model also does not include the effect of operational
temperature on the lifetime of the device. However,
the temperature does influence the rate of the HCI
degradation and must be modeled accordingly. In order
to include temperature in the MTTF, the model must be
based on the changes in substrate current. The MTTF
equation is the following:
MTTFHCI = B(Isub)−N exp(Ea
kT
), (3)
where B is a scale factor which is a function of
doping profiles, sidewall spacings and dimensions that
are specific to the manufacturing process characterization
(Isub) is the substrate current, N ranges from 2 to 4,k for
the Boltzmann’s constant, T is temperature, and Ea is
the activation energy in the range of −0.1eV to−0.2eV .
There is another way to model HCI degradation,
through a power law dependence on the stress time, t.
The HCI effect can be seen in shifts for the threshold
voltage Vth due to increased trap generation in the
oxide and the interface. Wang [9] proposed the following
model for the rate of change for the threshold voltage
Vth for NMOS devices:
∆Vth ∼
√
Qi exp(
Eox
Eo
) exp(− φit
qλEm
)tn
′
, (4)
where Eox is the oxide electric field, Em is the lateral
electric field, Qi is the inversion charge, φit is the trap
generation energy, λ is the hot electron mean free path
and Eo is the process-dependent factor. The model does
not include the temperature (T ) factor or the width (W )
factor as seen in the Equation(3) and Equation(1)
respectively.
B. Oxide/Dielectric Breakdown (OB):
In CMOS devices the strong electric fields across the
gate oxide can cause some material damage that will
lead to formation of a conductive path. The conductive
path within the dielectric will create a short between
the substrate and the gate, thus nullifying the isolating
properties of the gate oxide and resulting in complete
oxide failure. The oxide breakdown is a rather local
phenomenon in which holes and bulk electron trapping
damage the oxide material. There are two types of
oxide breakdown: early life oxide breakdown and time-
dependent dielectric breakdown.
The early life oxide breakdown is created through
impurities and weak chains within the dielectric layer
which is a direct result of the manufacturing process.
Any heavy alteration within the manufacturing process
that will greatly increase trap generation within the oxide
will lead to early oxide breakdown. Increase in trap gen-
eration can be caused by the following factors: presence
of mobile sodium (Na) ions in the oxide, impurities
trapped on the silicon interface during the oxidation,
and crystalline defects in the silicon. Time-dependent
dielectric breakdown (TDDB) consists of two phases:
a build-up phase and a runaway phase,[7]. During the
build-up phase, bulk electrons and holes gets randomly
trapped through out the oxide. The number of traps
increase with time, forming a high electric field which
depends on the voltage and oxide thickness[10].
Eox =
V
dox
(5)
Once the trap density reached the critical trap density
the runaway phase begins. During the runaway phase, the
total electric field produced by the trapped electrons and
holes exceeds the dielectric breakdown threshold,[10].
Once the electric field is strong enough, a conducting
path is formed within the oxide and current begins to
flow between the substrate and the gate. Due to this
behavior the time to total device failure due to oxide
breakdown can be modeled using Weibull probability
distribution.
The rate of trap generation is the key component in de-
termining the rate of oxide degradation and breakdown.
There are three general models for trap generation in
the oxide: Anode Hole Injection (AHI) model, Thermo-
Chemical (TC) model and Anode Hydrogen Release
(AHR) model, [7] These models are contradictory in
their explanation of the trap generation and the accel-
eration in the law of time-to-breakdown - tBD. However
two of the models, AHI (E model) and TC (1/E model)
can be summarized as follows:
tBD = τ0 ∗ exp(−n ∗ γ ∗ Enox) (6)
where τ0 and γ are constants and n is either 1 for (E
model) or -1 for ( 1E model). Both of these models are
designed primarily for thick gate oxides.
For ultra-thin oxides the primary driver of the break-
down process is gate voltage and at higher temperatures
the process is accelerated even more. To account for
these factors, a new relationship has been proposed for
the Median Time To Failure (MTTF) for the oxide
breakdown:
MTTFOB = TBD0(V ) exp(
a(V )
T
+
b(V )
T 2
), (7)
where TBD0, a and b are voltage dependent factors and
b
T 2 accounts for the temperature effect. There is another
MTTF model for thin oxides:
MTTFOB = A exp(
B
Eox
) exp(
Ea
kT
), (8)
where B stands for the electric field acceleration
factor, k for the Boltzmann’s constant, and T for the
absolute temperature.
C. Electromigration:
The electromigration (EM) effect can play a critical
role in circuit reliability at high current density (typically
exceeding 105 A/cm2),[7]. Energy and momentum from
electrons can be transferred to metal atoms and lead
to their biased movement towards the anode electrode.
This mass transport through interface diffusion or grain
boundary diffusion will create material depleted regions
near the cathode and regions with access material near
the anode. As a result, the layer could be damaged and
the damage is manifested as open circuit failure near the
cathode or short circuit failure near the anode regions.
EM is a thermally activated process and the median time
to failure (MTTF) can be described by the simplified
formula
MTTFEM = A ∗ (je)−n exp(Ea
kT
) (9)
where Ea is the activation energy of EM process, je
is the current density, A is a fabrication-dependent
constant and n can vary from 1 < n < 2 depending
on metal properties,[7],[10]. Both the activation energy
Ea and A constant depend on fabrication technology
and are defined by material type, grain structure, size
distribution, crystallographic orientation and impurities.
The constant A also depends on the geometry and length
of interconnects. It was shown, that activation energy
can be reduced more than twice (from 1.4eV − to −
[0.5− 0.8]eV ) by doping Al with a small amount of Cu
(0.3-5%), [7]. In reality, the EM failure is a complicated
process and non-Arrhenius temperature effects should be
taken into consideration to predict the failure times.
The poor metal quality, vacancies, and multiple ir-
regular grain boundaries result in significant reduction
of the activation energy that has severe effect on the
median time to failure due to an exponential dependence.
Electromigration induces stress gradients that compete
with EM mass transfer by causing ion movement from
compressive stress regions to regions with tensile stress.
Material type and methods of interconnect deposi-
tion for submicron SMOC technologies (physical va-
por deposition, PVD chemical vapor deposition, CVD;
atomic layer deposition, ALD; electroplating; annealing;
chemical-mechanical or electro-chemical-polishing) play
critical role in grain microstructure of interconnects that
determines the mass transport path and EM lifetimes.
D. Negative bias temperature instability
Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) is
known since the very early developments of MOS
devices; however, it is emerging as one of the ma-
jor degradation mechanisms for deep-submicron CMOS
technologies. NBTI causes a significant threshold volt-
age shift (50 − 100mV ) and decrease in drain current
mostly in p-channel metal-oxide-semiconductor field ef-
fect transistors (pMOSFET) under a negative gate bias at
elevated temperatures (100 − 150◦C). The effect is due
to creation of interface traps and to buildup of positive
oxide charge over periods of time (from several months
to years depending on the device operation conditions).
Trapped holes can be thermally activated and can cause
dissociation of oxide defects. The threshold voltage shift
∆Vth is expressed as:
∆Vth = A(Vg, t) exp(−ENB/kT ) (10)
where ENB is the NBTI activation energy
and A(Vg, t) is a function of gate voltage and
time,[7],[11],[10].
There are many models proposed to explain the NBTI
effect, including oxide hole injection, electron tunneling
and diffusion-reaction models. The most accepted model
is the diffusion-reaction (or electrochemical) concept
that relates the activation energy ENB to diffusion of
hydrogen species dissociate at the interface with multiple
hydrogen-terminated Si bonds (Si−H).
Deposition processes for current MOSFETs employ
oxynitride, SiON layer as a gate dielectric material
deposited by plasma enhanced CVD or rapid thermal
oxidation in presence of NO or NO2 gases. It was
shown that while introduction of nitrogen into oxide
layer improves transistor performance and increases di-
electric constant of gate material, it also reduces NBTI
lifetime by introducing bulk oxide defects and reduc-
ing thermal activation energy of defect generation at
Si/SiON interface. The threshold voltage shift and
NBTI lifetime strongly depend on the interfacial ni-
trogen concentration at the SiO2/Si interface that can
be controlled by temperature, pressure, duration of the
thermal nitridation processing step. Typical range of the
nitrogen concentration is around 2-15% for the thermal
nitridation process. Higher interfacial N concentrations
are usually achieved using decoupled plasma nitridation.
The higher nitrogen concentration, the larger ∆Vth shift
during NBTI stress.
TABLE I
SEMICONDUCTOR PROPERTIES
Degradation
Mechanisms Lifetime Equation Failure
Factors that effects
critical parameters
Hot Carrier Injec-
tion (HCI)
MTTFHCI = B(Isub) −N exp(Ea
kT
)
1) critical device switch-
ing time delay
2) non-responsive device
functionality
1) Drain doping levels
2) Channel lengths
3) Gate oxide thickness
4) Interface traps
5) Purity and quality of
gate oxide
Oxide Breakdown
(OB)
MTTFOB = A exp(
B
Eox
) exp(
Ea
kT
)
1) short circuit between
the gate and the sub-
strate
1) Purity of oxide layer
a) Crystal defects
b) Impurities (e.g.,
heavy metals)
c) Roughness of oxide
surface
2) Gate oxide thickness
Electromigration
(EM)
MTTFEM = A ∗ (je)−n exp(Ea
kT
)
1) short circuit condi-
tions
2) open circuit conditions
1) Interconnect metal type
2) Grain structure
3) Grain size distribution
4) Crystallographic orien-
tation
5) Impurities
6) Geometry and length of
interconnects
Negative bias tem-
perature instability
(NBTI) ∆Vth = A(Vg, t) exp(−ENBkT )
1) critical device switch-
ing time delay
2) non-responsive device
functionality
1) Nitrogen concentration
near Si/SiO2 interface,
2) Presence of boron
3) Water near Si/SiO2 in-
terface
4) Gate dimensions
5) Gate oxide thickness
III. CRITICAL PROCESS PARAMETERS
In this section, the critical process factors, that yield
maximum results for exploiting the wearing effects de-
scribed in the previous sections, are investigated. The
exponential nature of lifetime prediction of the device for
the wearing effects gives rise to Trojan alterations that
greatly accelerate the wearing mechanics of the device.
Table I shows a list of factors that can be modified
during the process manufacturing to induce reliability
Trojans through the time-based wearing effects. The
table shows the degradation mechanism, the lifetime
prediction model, the critical failures resulting from the
degradation mechanism, and the critical factors.
Knowing the process model, a process engineer can
influence one or more steps in the IC fabrication to
change one or more critical factors. This change will
inherently result in an accelerated MTTF model for one
or more degradation mechanism. The malicious process
modification (reliability Trojan) will guarantee higher
probability of the devices produced will have a greatly
reduced lifetime, as shown in Fig. 1.
IV. FUTURE WORK
The process modifications of time based wear out
mechanisms of HCI, NBTI, OB and EM will be sim-
ulated using TCAD to illustrate how variation in the IC
process, effect device lifetimes. We will show how these
wear out mechanism could be exploited for Trojans by
design modifications. We will also introduce condition-
based trigger class of Trojans, by investigating how the
phenomena of ESD, Latchup and soft errors could be
exploited as Trojans. We will illustrate how packaging
modifications could also be used to maliciously create
Trojans.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed the concept of a new class of
hardware Trojan that exploits early wear out mechanisms
in CMOS devices. There are no detection techniques
that can detect all the variations of these reliability
based Trojans. In any post-production tests the infected
transistor are operating just as well as normal transistors
with no discrepancy in performance. The danger lies
in the fact that until the Trojan transistor has been in
operation for some time, the circuit appears as if no
malicious alterations have been inserted. These reliability
Trojans are induced through minor variations in the man-
ufacturing process. Thus, there is a critical demand for
detection techniques that properly identify these Trojans.
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